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BRINGING IN THE SHEAVES:
HOME GROWN WHEAT, WEED, AND LIMITS ON THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE

M Reed Hoppe;
ABSTRACT

U

not allow us to
Court precedent does
Supreme
States
nited the full scope of federal regulation under the Commerce
define

Clause. It does, however, allow us to define the outer limits. By authorizing
federal regulation of homegrown wheat, Wickard v. Filburn has long been
seen as the furthest reach of the commerce power. It still is.
The Supreme Court's authorization of a federal statute regulating
home grown marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich is a quintessential application
of Wickard, though it is not an extension of that case. Wickard and Raich
allow federal regulation of intrastate economic activity when necessary to
support a federal market scheme involving fungible commodities. Whether
and to what extent the Supreme Court will allow federal regulation of
intrastate noneconomic activity remain open questions. Cases involving
noncommercial regulation should continue to be analyzed under the
multi-part Lopez/Morrison test to determine if the regulation "substantially
affects" interstate commerce.'
The Supreme Court's decision in National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius requires, as a constitutional minimum, that
federal enactments regulate existing economic activity, even under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress may not use its commerce power to
compel individuals to purchase a particular product or force them into a
regulated market. With the current composition of the Supreme Court, the
commerce power will not be stretched to cover activities that, if regulated,
M. Reed Hopper is a Principal Attorney with the nonprofit Pacific Legal Foundation.
See generally United States v. Lopez, 545 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
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would authorize a virtual federal police power like that enjoyed by the
States.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has recognized three categories of
activities that Congress is empowered to regulate under the Commerce
Clause. 2 First, Congress has unquestionable authority to regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce.' Second, Congress may "regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce."' Finally, Congress is authorized to regulate those
activities "that substantially affect interstate commerce."s The first two
categories

are

self-evident

because

they are

inherent in interstate

commerce. 6 The third category, however, is not part of interstate
commerce. Thus, the power to regulate such activities is anything but
self-evident.! Nevertheless, the "substantial effects" category is the most far
reaching and may define the outer limits of the commerce power. As
evidenced by the Supreme Court's decision regarding marijuana in Gonzales
v. Raich8 and, subsequently, the Affordable Care Act in NFIB v. Sebelius,9
those limits depend on Wickardv. Filburn,0 a case of homegrown wheat.
II. "SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS" AND THE ELASTIC POWER OF CONGRESS
The U.S. Supreme Court has relied on "substantial effects" to uphold a
variety of laws under the Commerce Clause (or more accurately, under the
Necessary and Proper Clause), but three cases are noteworthy for their
expansive application of the commerce power;: National Labor Relations

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
Id. at 558.
4 Id.
s Id. at 558-59.
6 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
7 Id.
I Id. at 52.
9 Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
"o Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
2
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Board (NLRB) v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,n United States v. Darby,12

and Wickard v. Filburn." The entirety of these cases set new standards for
Congress's authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
A. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.
In NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., Jones & Laughlin Steel

Corporation was charged with unfair labor practices under the National
Labor Relations Act when the corporation apparently discharged certain
employees because of their union affiliation.14 As a defense, Jones &
Laughlin Steel argued that the Act was constitutionally infirm because it
was not directed at commerce, but was a gambit aimed at subjecting all
industrial labor relations to federal control without regard to the effects on
interstate commerce.s To determine the object of the Act, the Court
looked to the statutory language itself and observed that the Act
empowered the National Labor Relations Board "to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce." 6 The
Act, in turn, defined "commerce" in the traditional sense to mean "trade,
traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
states."" The Act went further, defining the term "affecting commerce" as,
"in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce."" Because the Act
explicitly limited the Board's jurisdiction to only those labor practices
actually "affecting commerce," the Court found the Act to be a valid
Commerce Clause enactment." By "its terms," the Court noted, the Act
does "not impose collective bargaining upon all industry regardless of effects
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
13 Wickard, 317 U.S. 111.
14 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 22.
1s Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 29.
12

1

Id. at 30.

1

Id. at 31.

"

Id.
Id.at 31.

9
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upon interstate or foreign commerce."2 o Rather, the Court found, "[i]t
purports to reach only what may be deemed to burden or obstruct that
commerce, and thus qualified, it must be construed as contemplating the
exercise of control within constitutional bounds."21
The significance of this analysis, as would later become clear in United
States v. Lopez 2 and United States v. Morrison,23 lies in the Court's search

for a jurisdictional element tying the regulated activity to impacts affecting
commerce (so as to limit the scope of the Act to the delegated authority),
and the Court's reliance on the terms of the Act itself-what the act
expressly purports to regulate.
After upholding the Act facially, the Court considered whether the
regulated activity was within constitutional bounds as applied in that
particular case. Specifically, whether the unjustified firing of employees
would affect (i.e. burden or obstruct) interstate commerce.24 The record
showed that Jones & Laughlin Steel was the fourth largest steel producer in
the country. Jones & Laughlin Steel was composed of nineteen subsidiaries
and integrated operations throughout the nation, which produced,
transported, and sold products in interstate commerce.25 In counterpoint,
however, the discharged employees worked only in the local manufacturing
plant and were not involved in the transportation or sale of products in
interstate commerce. 26 According to the Court, this fact was not
determinative. 27 Rather, the case turned on how the stoppage of Jones &
Laughlin Steel's manufacturing operations by industrial strife, which the
National Labor Relations Act was designed to prevent, would affect
interstate commerce.28
In considering the matter, the Court relied on what it called the
fundamental principle "that the power to regulate commerce is the power to
20 Id.
21 Id. at 29.

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
14Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 32.
25
26

Id. at 25-26.

Id. at 40-41.

27 Id. at 41.
28 Id.
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enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and advancement. '"2
The Court said that power is plenary, and may be used to protect interstate
commerce "no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it.""
Thus, the Court ruled that, "although activities may be intrastate in
character when separately considered, if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control."" This
statement describes the third category of activity: activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce, which Congress is authorized to regulate under
the Commerce Clause. As with similar statements of the "substantial
effects" category of Commerce Clause regulation, the Court focused on
finding a "close and substantial" impact on interstate commerce and
determined whether the regulation was necessary and proper32 "to protect
that commerce."3 3
In view of Jones & Laughlin Steel's far-flung activities, the Court
found the stoppage of its intrastate manufacturing operations by industrial
strife would have a serious effect on interstate commerce that is direct,
immediate, and catastrophic.34 When an industry on a national scale makes
its relation to interstate commerce a "dominant factor," the Court
concluded that Congress may regulate labor relations "to protect interstate
commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war." 5
B. United States v. Darby
In United States v. Darby, the Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which prohibited the shipment of goods in interstate
" Id. at 36-37 (internal citation omitted).
3o Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37 (citing Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.
(Second
Employers' Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912)).
31 id.
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have Power.. . To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers .. .
33 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
3 Id. at 41.
35 id.
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commerce produced without compliance with the Act's standards for
employee wages and hours."6 The Court determined interstate commerce is
impaired when it is used as an instrument of unfair competition "in the
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions." 7 This
case extended the reach of the Commerce Clause to local manufacturing
operations, which had previously been considered beyond the scope of
Congressional authority." The Court explained the scope of that authority
in these terms:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states.
It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate
means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of
the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.39
Once again, the Court's inquiry was directed at both the significance
of the regulated activities' effects on interstate commerce and the legitimacy
of the end, or purpose, of the regulation (i.e., whether Congress was
actually exercising control over interstate commerce.)
C. Wickard v. Filburn
In a further extension of the "substantial effects" category of
Commerce Clause enactments, the Supreme Court in Wickard v.
Filburn4 oupheld the regulation of homegrown wheat under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938. Among other things, that Act involved a national
regulatory scheme to control wheat prices by regulating the volume of
36Darby, 312 U.S. at 109.
3 Id. at 115.
3' Id. at 115-17.
31 Id. at 118.
' Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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wheat in the market. "Acreage limitations were the Act's primary tool for
controlling the supply of federally subsidized crops."4 1 Before the 1941
planting season, it was clear that the low price of wheat was the result of
excessive supply.4 2 Thus, "[o]nly stiffer penalties on excess production
could prevent already overflowing stocks from surpassing the all-time high,
which had been reached in 1940."43
Under the Act, the Secretary of Agriculture was directed "to proclaim
a national acreage allotment for each year's wheat crop... . . . ."" Because of
a growing fear of a glut in the market and an associated price crash,
allotments were set and penalties raised for excess crops during the 1941
growing season.4 5 Roscoe Filburn was subject to this regulation.
Filburn was a lifelong farmer who raised dairy cattle and poultry.4 He
also grew wheat , which he sold, fed to his cattle and poultry, and used for
household consumption.4 7 Additionally, Filburn ran a commercial business
selling milk and eggs from the cattle and poultry he fed with the wheat to
about seventy-five customers a day.48 Filburn's allotment was 11.1 acres,
but he planted twenty-three acres. The extra acreage yielded 239 bushels of
wheat in excess of Filburn's allotment. Filburn was subjected to a fine for
the excess, which he subsequently challenged in federal court.
On review, the Supreme Court held that homegrown wheat is a
fungible commodity that competes with wheat in interstate commerce
either by entering the market or, if consumed by the grower, reducing the
purchase of wheat in the market.49 While the grower's "own contribution
to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself," the Court held that the
aggregate economic effect of "others similarly situated, is far from trivial"
and can be regulated.o
By amassing trivial effects of similar activity to find a "substantial
" Jim Chen, Filburn'sLegacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1734 (2003).
42

Td

43

Id.

Id. at 1735.
Id.
'6 Id. at 1734.
41 Chen, supra note 42, at 1734.
48Id.
49 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
50 Id. at 127-28.
"
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Wickard pushed the very limits of

Congress's Commerce Clause authority.s" Never had the Court so liberally
construed or so broadly applied the commerce power. Together, Jones &
Laugh/in Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in a new era of expanding

federal regulation of intrastate activity that seemingly recognized no limit
on congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. Indeed, lower
courts have relied on these cases to justify federal regulation of
noneconomic intrastate activity, such as endangered species protection,
without regard to the inherent limitations of the commerce power. 52 In
Lopez and Morrison, however, the Court declared it had gone far enough in
broadening the scope of the Commerce Clause. The Court seemingly drew
a constitutional line at Wickard, which Congress may not pass.
III. CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR GETTING BACK ON TRACK
Contrary to the prevailing view in the lower courts that Supreme
Court jurisprudence required the proverbial "rubber stamp" on Congress's
Commerce Clause enactments, the Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison
found that its Commerce Clause cases, including Jones & Laughlin Steel,
Darby, and Wickard, established definite limits to the commerce power.
From these limits, the Supreme Court built a new framework for analyzing
"substantial effects" and determining the constitutionality of federal
legislation purportedly enacted under the Commerce Clause.
A. United States v. Lopez
Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was indicted for violating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990.s" That Act made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has

51Id.

See generally Ala.-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1272-73 (11th Cit.
2007); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton (GDF), 326 F.3d 622, 639 (5th Cit. 2003); Rancho Viejo,
LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cit. 2003); and Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cit. 2000).
s' United States v. Lopez, 545 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
5
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reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."5 4 The Act defined the term
"school zone" as "in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private
school" or within a distance of 1,000 feet of such a school.ss
On March 10, 1992, Lopez, a twelfth grade student, arrived at school
with a concealed 0.38 caliber handgun and five bullets.5 He was arrested
and initially charged with firearm possession under state law, but state
charges were dropped when federal officers charged Lopez with a federal
crime under § 9 2 2 (q) of the Act.s" Lopez sought to dismiss the indictment
as beyond the commerce power of Congress.s The District Court upheld
the Act, holding that § 9 2 2 (q) "is a constitutional exercise of Congress's
well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce."" On
appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that "section 9 2 2 (q), in
the full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause."o The Supreme Court affirmed. 1
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist started with first
principles, stating that the "Constitution creates a Federal Government of
enumerated powers. "62 This principle, he suggested, was "adopted by the
Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties" by maintaining
the balance of power between the states and the federal government so as to
reduce the risk of abuse from either side. 6' As for the enumerated power
delegated to Congress, "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,"64 Justice Rehnquist
emphasized the inherent limitations found in the very language of the
clause. 5
Chief Justice Rehnquist cited, for example, the observation of Chief

" Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990).
s Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (1990).
s6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
57 id.
58 Id.

' Id. at 551-52.
60 Id. at 552.
61 id
62

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.

63 id.

64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6s Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57.
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Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden," when the Court first defined the
commerce power:
Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly
be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States
than one ... . The enumeration presupposes something not
enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language,
or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively
internal commerce of a State."6 7
Another inherent limitation to the commerce power, recognized by the
Gibbons Court and the majority in Lopez, was that the commerce power is
the power to regulate or to "prescribe the rule by which commerce [itself] is
governed.'"
Chief Justice Rehnquist credited Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and
Wickard for creating an era of constitutional jurisprudence that greatly
increased the commerce power of Congress beyond the limits previously
defined by the Court." But, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, even those
expansive precedents affirmed that the commerce power is "subject to outer
limits."" Defining these limits, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited the Court's
warning in Jones & Laughlin Steel that the commerce power is constrained
by our "dual system" of federal and state governments, and may not be
stretched to encompass "indirect and remote" effects on interstate
commerce so as to extinguish "the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government."" He also
took pains to characterize Wickard as the Court's "most far reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,"n noting
that at least that case involved some economic activity, and that the

" Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194--95 (1824).
6 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)).
68 id.
69 Id. at 556.
70 Id. at 557.
7 Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
7 Id. at 560.
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Agricultural Adjustment Act upheld by the Court was a market scheme
directed at regulating competition in commerce directly affected by
home-grown wheat." The Chief Justice concluded that the Court had
always heeded the warning expressed in Jones & Laughlin Steel to observe
the constitutional structure, even in those cases where the congressional
enactment was upheld based on "substantial effects," and the Court's
inquiry in such cases was "to decide whether a rational basis existed for
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate
commerce." 74
After laying this foundation of a limited commerce power, the Court
had no difficulty concluding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act had
exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority and was constitutionally
invalid. The framework the Court followed in reaching this conclusion is
significant.
The Court readily determined that Lopez was a "substantial effects"
case. For that determination, the Court looked to the object of § 922(q) and
observed that it did not purport to regulate the use of channels of interstate
commerce nor prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity
through channels of commerce." Likewise, because the statutory provision
prohibited mere possession of a gun in a school zone," it could not be
justified as a regulation to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce
or a thing in interstate commerce.n If § 9 2 2 (q) were to be upheld, it would
have to be under the third category of Commerce Clause enactments, "as a
regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce."
First, the Court examined the text of the statute and found that, unlike
the statute in Wickard, § 9 2 2 (q) by its own terms had "nothing to do with
'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might
define the terms." 9 This obvious conclusion was compelled by the express

" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57.
74 id.
7s Id. at 559.
'6 Id. at 561.
77

Id.

78

Id. at 559.

7

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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language of the Act, which made the mere possession of a firearm in a
school zone a crime. The Court also found that the prohibited act, the
possession of a gun, was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated."so In fact, the Act was a criminal
statute that did not involve a commercial or economic regulatory scheme at
all." Section 9 22(q) could not be sustained, therefore, under Court
precedent like Wickard, which allowed congressional regulation of activities
"that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which
viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce." 82
Interestingly, the Court came to this conclusion even though the prohibited
activity, possession of a gun, involved an indisputably commercial item.
After rejecting the aggregation approach to sustaining the regulation of
an intrastate activity that is not economic in nature, the Court sought to
determine whether § 9 22(q) contained a "jurisdictional element" that would
ensure on a case-by-case basis that the possession of a firearm substantially
affects interstate commerce." For this determination, the Court turned
again to the language of the Act and found that it did not provide an
express requirement that would "limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm
possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on
interstate commerce." 8 4 Because no substantial effect was "visible to the
naked eye" in the text of the Act itself, the Court looked at legislative
history to identify any express congressional findings that demonstrated
Congress's belief that possession of a gun in a school zone substantially
affected interstate commerce.s The Court was unable to identify any such
findings.
Nevertheless, the government argued that Congress could have
rationally concluded that § 92 2 (q) did substantially affect interstate
commerce because possession of a gun in a school zone could result in
s Id.
o
81 Id.
62

Id.

83 id.
84

Id.

'~ Lopez,

514 U.S. at 562-63.
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violent crime and violent crime interferes with the national economy in two
respects: (1) violent crime increases the cost of insurance throughout the
nation; and, (2) violent crime deters people from traveling to unsafe areas.

The government also argued that guns in schools undermine the learning
environment, generating less productive. citizens, which hurts the national
economy. To underscore its limitations on the commerce power, the Court
addressed the implications of these arguments."
The government acknowledged that under the "costs of crime"
argument, Congress could regulate any activity that might lead to violent
crime no matter how remote the connection to interstate commerce.88
Likewise, the Court found that under the government's "national
productivity" argument, Congress could regulate anything related to
individual economic productivity." The Court concluded that if these
arguments were accepted, it would be "hard pressed" to find any individual
activity Congress could not regulate under its commerce power. 9
"Depending on the level of generality," the Court observed, "any activity
can be looked upon as commercial." 9' This was the fallacy in the
government's arguments; it provided no logical stopping point to
congressional authority and converted the commerce power into a general
police power similar to that enjoyed by the states.92 This is significant
because although some of the Court's cases leaned in that direction and
suggested a possible expansion of the commerce power, the Court
invalidated § 9 2 2 (q) as an unauthorized Commerce Clause enactment and
declined in Lopez to go any further." "To do so," the Court stated, "would
require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does
not presuppose something not enumerated ...and that there never will be a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."94
6 Id. at 563-64.
* Id. at 564.
88 Id.

89 Id.
90 Id.

9' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565.
92

Id. at 567.

93 Id.

94Id. at 567-68 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
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B. United States v. Morrison
Morrison is instructive because of what it says about the Court's
decision in Lopez. 5 In the fall of 1994, Christy Brzonkala enrolled at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute."6 Shortly after meeting fellow students
Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, Brzonkala alleged they assaulted
and repeatedly raped her.97 Brzonkala filed a complaint against the students
under the school's Sexual Assault Policy. 98 After a hearing, the school's
Judicial Committee found Morrison guilty of sexual assault and suspended
him for two semesters.99 Crawford was not punished due to lack of
evidence.100 Morrison's punishment was set aside, however, on
administrative appeal."0 ' Brzonkala then filed a suit in federal court against
Morrison and Crawford under § 13981 of the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994. The Act provided a federal civil remedy for victims of
gender-motivated violence and stated that, "persons within the United
States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender."' 02 The Act defined a "crime of violence motivated by gender" as a
crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."103 The
district court dismissed the suit because it determined that § 13981 was an
invalid Commerce Clause enactment. The en banc Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court both affirmed.
Writing again for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist returned to
first principles, reaffirming that all laws passed by Congress must find
authority in the Constitution and that the powers of Congress are

Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
s See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
6 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
97 Id.

" Id. at 603.

9 Id.
100

Id.

101 Id.

§ 13981(b), invalidatedby United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
1- Id. § 13981(d)(1).
12 42 U.S.C.
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limited. 0 4 As Lopez emphasized, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "Even
under our modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
Congress's regulatory authority is not without effective bounds."'s Since

§ 13981 focused "on gender-motivated violence wherever it occurs" and was
not directed at the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or interstate
markets, or even things or persons in interstate commerce, the majority
determined that the Act would have to fall within the third category of
Commerce Clause regulation as a regulation of activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.106 To conduct its constitutional analysis,
therefore, the Court concluded that Lopez provided the appropriate
framework.'
According to the Court, four factors contributed to its decision in
Lopez.os The first factor was that the statute, by its terms, had nothing to
do with commerce or an economic enterprise; that is, the Act did not
purport to regulate economic activity.o' The second factor was that the Act
contained "no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a
discrete set of [activities] that additionally have an explicit connection with
or effect on interstate commerce."" 0 This factor was important to establish
that the Act was in "pursuance of Congress's regulation of interstate
commerce.""' The third factor was that neither the statute "nor its
legislative history contain[ed] express congressional findings regarding the
effects upon interstate commerce" of the regulated activity.1' 2 Finally, the
fourth factor stated that the connection between the regulated activity and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce was remote.1 3
With this framework underlying the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis, resolution of the case was clear." 4 First, the Court succinctly held
1" Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
10s
16

Id. at 608.

Id. at 609.

107 Id
108 Id.
10' Id. at 610.

no Morrison,529 U.S. at 611-12.
"' Id. at 612.
112
113
114

Id.
id.
Id. at 613.
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that the statute, by its terms, had nothing to do with commerce:
"gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity.""s As a result, gender-motivated crimes were not the
type of activity that, through repetition elsewhere, would substantially affect
interstate commerce."' Thus, not even Wickards aggregation principle was
availing.117 This was critical to the outcome of the case. As the majority
observed, the noneconomic and criminal nature of the prohibited activity in
Lopez was central to its decision in that case."s But the Court did not stop
there. To further illustrate the importance of this factor, the Court stated,
as matter of historical fact, that it had upheld federal regulation of intrastate
activity based on its "substantial effects" on interstate commerce only when
the regulated activity was economic in nature."' This includes Wickard.
Next, the Court held that the Violence Against Women Act did not
contain an express "jurisdictional element" establishing that Congress was
attempting to regulate interstate commerce.' 20 Rather than limit its reach
to a discrete set of gender-motivated violent crimes that had a perspicuous
connection with or effect on interstate commerce, § 13981 was drawn too
broadly and included purely intrastate violent crime." The language of the
Act did not support the conclusion that § 13981 was adequately tied to
interstate commerce.122
Unlike the situation in Lopez, however, the Court did find that the
Violence Against Women Act was supported by congressional findings that
gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce.' 23 Among others,
those effects included deterring victims from traveling interstate or
engaging in interstate business. 124 The Court also cited diminishing
national productivity, increased medical costs, and a decrease in the supply

115 Id.
16

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11.

at 611 n.4.
us Id. at 610.
1' Id. at 611 and 613.
7Id.

120 Id. at 613.
121

id.

a Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.

123Id. at 614.
124 Id. at 615.
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and demand of interstate goods.1 5 The Court did not believe, however,
that those findings were sufficient to uphold the Act under the Commerce
Clause. 126 The Court explained, "[s]imply because Congress may conclude
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not
make it so."1 2 7 That determination, the majority held, is for the Court to
decide.
. Since Congress followed the "but for" causal chain from the original
violent act to every remote effect upon interstate commerce, the Court
decided that Congress's findings were faulty and relied on a "method of
reasoning" that obliterates the distinction between what is national and
what is local, which the Court had already rejected in Lopez.' 8 The Court
was unwilling to allow Congress to regulate noneconomic activity, such as
gender-motivated acts of violence, based only on that activity's attenuated
effects on interstate commerce.129 Therefore, the Court held that Congress
did not have authority under the Commerce Clause to enact § 13981 of the
Violence Against Women Act. 30
IV. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT WAS DOING IN LOPEZ AND MORRISON

Lopez and Morrison are critical to understanding modern Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Beyond the obvious objective of resolving the legal
issues raised in those cases, it is equally obvious that the Supreme Court
used those cases to school Congress and the lower courts in the distinct
limits of the commerce power.13 '
The Supreme Court's repeated reference to "first principles" seems to
125 id.

id.
id.
12sMorrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
129 Id at 617.
126
127

o Id. at 619.

11 Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676-77 (2012) (Scalia, J.,

Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting) ("It should be the responsibility of the Court to ...
[r]emind our people that the Framers considered structural protections of freedom the most important
ones, for which reason they alone were embodied in the original Constitution and not left to later
amendment. The fragmentation of power produced by the structure of our Government is central to
liberty, and when we destroy it, we place liberty at peril.").
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get lost in the academic debate over the reach of the Commerce Clause. In
both Lopez and Morrison, however, the Court's understanding of "first
principles" determined the outcome of those cases. As explained in Lopez
and reiterated in Morrison, the Court understood "first principles" to mean
that the Constitution established a federal government of enumerated
powers which are few and defined, in contrast to the powers of the States
which are numerous and indefinite.' The Court emphasized that this
limitation on federal authority was necessary to ensure fundamental liberties
and protect the nation against the unfettered federal power of a "completely
centralized government."' Consequently, while some cases had broadly
construed the power delegated to Congress to regulate commerce, the
majority noted in Lopez that the Court had never abandoned "first
principles" and its cases had set distinct limits on Congress's exercise of the
commerce power.' 34 To determine those limits, the Court put forward the
four-part Lopez test for regulation that must be upheld, if at all, as the
regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. In the
end, the Court seeks to determine if a challenged statute or provision
provides a meaningful limit on federal power. If not, it will not be
sustained.
This conclusion is not simply an academic observation;, it is a
statement of substantive law. In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court
took pains to trace the development of its Commerce Clause cases from
Gibbons v. Ogden, in which the Court initially defined the nature of the
commerce power,135 to Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard.'
Nearly half of the majority opinion in Lopez is devoted to extracting from
these cases the fundamental concept that the Commerce Clause has distinct
limits.
In its Commerce Clause cases, the Supreme Court has consistently
defined those limits in terms of the legitimate ends for which the commerce
power can be employed. Starting with Ogden, the Court affirmed that the
12

See United States v. Lopez, 545 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).

1
134

Id. at 552-55.

135
16

Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 556.
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commerce power was the power to regulate commerce."' In other words,
the Ogden Court recognized that Congress has authority to regulate
commerce itself. The Court saw this as an inherent limitation on the
commerce power. For example, the Court observed that the constitutional
grant of authority to regulate interstate commerce presupposes that
Congress cannot regulate that which is not interstate commerce, such as
purely intrastate commerce.' While the Supreme Court has seemingly
leaned away from this restrictive view in later cases, the Court has not lost
sight of the principle that the legitimate end of the commerce power is the
regulation of interstate commerce itself.
Even when the Court was stretching the bounds of the Commerce
Clause to encompass some types of intrastate activity, the touchstone of the
Court's "substantial effects" cases was whether the statute governed
interstate commerce. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Supreme Court held
that Congress could regulate intrastate activities the control of which is
"essential or appropriate to protect [interstate] commerce from burdens and
obstructions."139 Likewise, in Darby, the Court held that Congress could
regulate intrastate activities for the "attainment of a legitimate end, the
exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce."1 40 In United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.,141 which was
decided the same year as Wickard, the Court held that the power of
Congress to regulate commerce "extends to those intrastate activities which
in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted
power."142 There is a unifying theme within these decisions: the power to
regulate interstate commerce is limited to the power to enact "all
appropriate legislation" for "its protection and advancement." 143 This
fundamental principle greatly simplifies Commerce Clause analysis under
the "substantial effects" category. It is the key to understanding Lopez and
17

Id. at 553.

"' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553.
139 Jones & Laughlin, 301

U.S. at 37.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
141 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942).
142 Id. at 119.
143 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added) (citing
The Daniel Ball., 10 Wall.
557, 564, 19 L.Ed. 999).
14
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Morrison.

The majority opinion in Lopez opens with its holding:
The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the possession [of a gun] be
connected in any way to interstate commerce. We hold that
the Act exceeds the authority of Congress "to regulate
Commerce ... among the several States .... 144
This statement of the Court's ultimate finding in the case is a succinct
pronouncement of the constitutional standard for determining if a statute
"substantially affects" interstate commerce.
A statute that does not regulate a commercial or economic activity, or
does not expressly require that the regulated activity have any connection
with interstate commerce, is clearly not enacted to protect or advance
interstate commerce. Such a statute cannot be said to be in pursuance of a
legitimate Commerce Clause end;-the exercise of Congress's power to
govern interstate commerce. This conclusion follows from the Court's
understanding of "first principles," which dictate meaningful limits to
protect the federal-state balance. Accordingly, the first Lopez factor is
directed at determining whether Congress chose to regulate an economic or
commercial activity directly, whereas the other three factors are directed at
determining whether Congress required the regulated activity to have a
direct and concrete connection to interstate commerce.

1

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
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V. GONSALEZ V.RAlcH- WICKARD REVISITED
The "substantial effects" test as refined by Lopez and Morrison was
soon to be tested in a case challenging the constitutionality of the federal
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), as applied to the purely private and local
manufacture, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes. In
1996, the State of California passed the Compassionate Use Act, which
exempted from state criminal prosecution physicians, patients, and
caregivers who possess or cultivate marijuana for medical use on a
physician's approval. 145 Angel Raich and Diane Monson were two
California residents suffering from a variety of ailments who sought to avail
themselves of the Compassionate Use Act's protections.' 46 Monson was
able to cultivate her own marijuana, which she smoked or atomized using a
vaporizer. 4 7 Raich was unable to cultivate her own marijuana and relied on
caregivers who grew and provided the substance without charge.'
The State's Compassionate Use Act contravened the Controlled
Substances Act. The CSA made it a federal crime to "manufacture,
distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled substances," including
marijuana, except as the CSA allowed.' 49 Monson ran afoul of the CSA in
2000 when, pursuant to the Act, agents from the federal Drug Enforcement
Administration entered her home and destroyed her six cannabis plants."so
Monson and Raich subsequently sought an injunction against the United
States from enforcing the CSA "to the extent it prevent[ed] them from
possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical
use151
The district court denied the injunction, but the Ninth Circuit
reversed. Relying on Lopez and Morrison, the split panel held that
intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana

145

Raich, 545 U.S. at 5.

Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
148 id.
149 Id. at 13.
1so Id. at 65 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
11 Raich, 545 U.S. at 7.
146
147
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constituted a class of purely local activities that could not be reached by the
53
commerce power.s 2 On writ of certiorari, however, in Gonzales v. Raich,1
the Supreme Court upheld the CSA against the constitutional challenge..
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the power
granted Congress to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution," its authority to "regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states" included "the power to prohibit the
local cultivation and use of marijuana."154
In answering the question, the majority found the "similarities between
[Raich] and Wickard. . . striking.""ss What struck the court in particular was
that the respondents, Raich and Monson, were, like the farmer in Wickard,
cultivating for home use a "fungible commodity" 15' for which an
established, albeit illegal, interstate market existed.s 7 The Court explained,
"[jlust as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was designed to control the
volume" of wheat in interstate commerce and thereby the market price, "a
primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and demand of
controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets."15 In
Wickard, it "had no difficulty concluding" that Congress could rationally
believe that, "when viewed in the aggregate," excluding home-consumed
wheat from "the regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on

152

id.

153

Id. at 33.

15' Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (,explaining the "substantial effects" category of Commerce
Clause regulation is "misleading because, unlike the channels, instrumentalities, and agents of interstate
commerce, activities that substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate
commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the Commerce Clause alone. Rather,
as this Court has acknowledged since at least United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 9 L.Ed. 1004 (1838),
Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate
commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the
Necessary and Proper Clause.").
I Raich, 545 U.S. at 2.
15. Id. at 40 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Not only is it impossible to distinguish 'controlled
substances manufactured and distributed intrastate' from 'controlled substances manufactured and
distributed interstate,' but it hardly makes sense to speak in such terms. Drugs like marijuana are
fungible commodities. As the Court explains, marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for
personal use is never more than an instant from the interstate market and this is so whether or not the
possession is for medicinal use or lawful use under the laws of a particular State.").
15 Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
.ssId. at 19.
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price and market conditions."' 59 Likewise, the Court reasoned, "Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana
outside federal control would similarly affect price and market
conditions."160
In contrast, the dissent argued that Lopez and Morrison precluded this
determination because the regulated activities were neither commercial nor
economic in nature. Justice O'Connor opined that Raich was "materially
indistinguishable" from those two cases. 161 Although the majority
acknowledged that Raich was not engaged in commercial activity because
she did not sell marijuana,1 62 the majority belittled the dissent's view stating
that the "statutory challenges at issue in those cases were markedly different
from the challenge to the CSA."'6' The pivotal distinction the court cited
was that in Raich respondents challenged individual applications of a
"concededly valid statutory scheme," whereas in Lopez and Morrison the
parties argued that an entire statute or provision was beyond the commerce
power.' 64
According to the Court, the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in
Lopez, unlike the Controlled Substances Act, was "a brief, single-subject
statute" that did not regulate "any economic activity" whatsoever and as
such, the regulated activity could not be aggregated to show substantial
effects on interstate commerce.' Morrison was no different. 6 6 Thus, the
Court concluded the CSA was at the "opposite end of the regulatory
spectrum."16' The majority observed that contrary to the statutes in Lopez
and Morrison, the CSA was a broad, detailed statute establishing a
"comprehensive framework for regulating the production, distribution, and
possession" of "controlled substances" and control of Schedule I drugs like
marijuana was an "essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity
159 Id.
160 Id.
161

Id. at 45.

162 Id. at 50.
163

164

Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added).

id.

Id. at 23-24.
'66 Id. at 25.
165Id. at 24.
165
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in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated."168
Ultimately, the deciding factor for the majority was its conclusion that
the CSA was a regulation of "quintessentially economic" activity involving
the "production, distribution, and consumption of [fungible] commodities"
in the regulated market, like the Agricultural Adjustment Act in Wickard.169
Simply put, the CSA was a market scheme. That determination was
enshrined in the court's actual holding:
Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive
legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible

commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority to
"make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to
"regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8. That the regulation ensnares some
purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done
many times before, we refuse to excise individual
components of that larger scheme.170

The dissent was alarmed by the holding and suggested that it signaled
a course correction away from Lopez and Morrison back toward the
dangerous shoals of a limitless commerce power." Justice Scalia found this
concern overblown by limiting Raich to its facts:
Today's principal dissent objects that, by permitting
Congress to regulate activities necessary to effective
interstate regulation, the Court reduces Lopez and Morrison
to little "more than a drafting guide." Post, at 2223 (opinion
of O'CONNOR, J.). I think that criticism unjustified.
Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a

16
169

Id. at 36 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.

17

Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
Id. at 51 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

17

2014-2015]

65

BRINGING IN THE SHEAVES

substantial effect on interstate commerce, the power to
enact laws enabling

effective regulation

of interstate

commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with
congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it
extends only to those measures necessary to make the
interstate regulation effective.172
In short, according to Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in NFIB v.
Sebelius, Raich does "not represent the expansion of the federal power to
direct into a broad new field." "'
subsequently note in NFIB,,

174

As Chief Justice Roberts would

Wickard is still regarded as the most

far-reaching Supreme Court Commerce Clause case.17

How far the

Supreme Court will extend the commerce power to intrastate activities
under a non-market scheme remains to be seen. 76

VI. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE
COMMERCE POWER
Although it is still unclear how far the Supreme Court will go in

Raich, 545 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added).
Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2646 (2012).
'7 Id. at 2578.
's Id. at 2588.
176 In Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 730 (2006), the petitioner challenged the federal
government's regulation of unpermitted discharges to remote wetlands, under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act, as beyond the statutory language, as well as the commerce power. Although a majority of the
Court determined that the language of the Clean Water Act did not authorize the regulation of remote,
insubstantial water bodies, therefore avoiding the constitutional question, Justice Kennedy's lone
concurring opinion suggested that, by including a requirement that a regulated water body have a
"significant nexus" to a downstream navigable-in-fact water, no constitutional conflict would arise. See
id. at 739, 782. Justice Kennedy dearly equated a "significant nexus" to a "navigable-in-fact water" with
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 782-83. The problem with this, however, is that the
Clean Water Act itself did not contain an express (or even implied) requirement that the regulated water
body (such as a remote wetland) have any sort of connection to interstate commerce. 33 U.S.C.A. §
1362; Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730-31. In effect, therefore, by requiring that the government show a
significant nexus" between a remote water body and a downstream navigable-in-fact water, Justice
Kennedy was rewriting the Clean Water Act to include a jurisdictional element that would limit the
reach of the Act to a discrete set of activities that have an "explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce" as required by Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62, and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. This would save
the Act from constitutional scrutiny and possible invalidation. Justice Kennedy's citation to Raich was
gratuitous because Raich does not require a jurisdictional element. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 783.
12

'

KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.

66

[Vol.7 No. 1

authorizing federal regulation of intrastate activity in the absence of a
comprehensive economic statute that controls an entire market in fungible
commodities, we now know the outer limits of the commerce power.
Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in
2010.'7 A key provision of that Act--the individual mandate--required
most people to obtain a minimal amount of health insurance through their
employer, a government program, or by direct purchase.17 ' Failure to do so
would subject the individual to an economic "penalty."179 The mandate was
challenged on constitutional grounds by twenty-six states, several
individuals, and the National Federation of Independent Business. 8 o The
mandate was declared invalid by the district court and the Eleventh Circuit
for exceeding the commerce power; the Supreme Court affirmed in NFIB
v. Sebelius, although the mandate was upheld on other grounds."'
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court's principal opinion,182 which is
reminiscent of ChiefJustice Rehnquist's discussion in Lopez in that it serves
to remind Congress and lower courts (and perhaps also the people) that
congressional powers are limited to those enumerated and Congress does
not have the plenary power vested in the states to regulate for the general
welfare.' 8 He stated that this limit is by design and intended to protect
individuals from federal overreach.' 84 Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged,
as he must, that Congress is expressly authorized to regulate commerce
among the States, and that "power over activities that affect interstate
commerce can be expansive."185 As an example of how expansive this power
can be, Chief Justice Roberts cited the regulation of locally grown wheat in
Wickard.'" The Chief Justice explained, "Wickard has long been regarded as
177NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2580.
178 id
179 id.
180

Id

1s1Id. at 2580-81, 2591; seeid. at 2598, 2600 (upholding the individual mandate under the taxing
power).
182 Although Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito dissented from the Court's final
judgment upholding the individual mandate under the taxing power, they agreed with Justice Roberts
that the mandate was invalid under the commerce power. See id. at 2644-50.
18 Id. at 2577-78; United States v. Lopez, 545 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
14 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2578.
185 Id.

"' Id at 25 78-79.
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'perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity'" in the history of the nation.'
But Roberts also
observed that the individual mandate reaches even farther by regulating
inactivity.
It is undisputed that the Affordable Care Act is a comprehensive
economic regulatory scheme. Like the Agricultural Adjustment Act in
Wickard or the Controlled Substances Act in Raich, the Affordable Care
Act regulates an entire market. The government therefore argued that
Wickard and Raich were controlling, and Congress could mandate the
individual purchase of health insurance because, in the aggregate, such
purchases have a "substantial effect on interstate commerce," or the
mandate is "necessary and proper" to effectuate the Act.'" But Chief
Justice Roberts distinguished those cases.
In all of the Court's prior Commerce Clause cases, including Wickard
and Raich, Roberts noted that Congress was regulating "preexisting
economic activity."189 In contrast, the individual mandate "does not
regulate existing commercial activity."'90 To the contrary, the mandate

"compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product,
on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce."' 9' In
other words, the mandate creates the commerce it seeks to regulate.' 92
Chief Justice Roberts observed that relying on this logic would allow the
federal government to pull individuals within its regulatory power by
compelling them to buy certain products.' 9' This is barred under the
Constitution. 19 4 Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts held Wickard and Raich
Id. at 2588 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S., at 560).
at 2585.
' NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2590 ("Each one of our cases, including those cited by Justice Ginsburg. .
. involved preexisting economic activity. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S., at 127-129, 63 S.Ct. 82 (producing
wheat); Raich, supra, at 25, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (growing marijuana).").
190Id. at 2587.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 2586 ("The Constitution grants Congress the power to 'regulate Commerce.' Art. I, § 8,
cl. 3 (emphasis added). The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial
activity to be regulated. If the power to 'regulate' something included the power to create it, many of the
provisions in the Constitution would be superfluous.")
193 Id. at 2588, 2591.
194 Id. at 2591 ("The individual mandate forces individuals into commerce precisely because they
elected to refrain from commercial activity. Such a law cannot be sustained under a clause authorizing
1..

188NFIB, 132 S.Ct.
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are unavailing because inactivity cannot be aggregated to show a substantial
effect on interstate commerce and the regulation of inactivity is not
"necessary and proper" to the regulation of existing commerce.' 95
This, then, is the outer limit of the Commerce Clause: as a
constitutional minimum, the regulation must apply to "preexisting
economic activity."
VII. CONCLUSION

Current Supreme Court precedent is insufficient to define the full
scope of the Commerce Clause. It is, however, sufficient to define the
contours of that power. Under NFIB, Congress may not: (1) regulate
inactivity; 196 (2) compel individuals to purchase a commodity or enter a
market; '9 and, (3) create by regulation the very market it seeks to
regulate.' Instead, Congress may only regulate preexisting activity.' So
far, the Supreme Court has only upheld the regulation of preexisting
economic activity, including Wickard and Raich.200

There is some debate about whether Chief Justice Roberts' Commerce
Clause analysis in NFIB is dicta with little or no precedential value.201 This
is a purely academic debate, however, because it is clear that Justices Scalia,
Congress to 'regulate Commerce.'").
s Id. at 2587-94.
196 NFIB, 132 S.Ct. at 2590.
197 Id. at 2573 ("The Framers knew the difference between doing something and doing nothing.
They gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it.").
1" Id. at 2586 ("If the power to 'regulate' something included the power to create it, many of the
provisions in the Constitution would be superfluous.").
199Id. at 2590.
" Some confusion remains as to whether Wickard and Raich involved economic activity, but it is
clear that a majority on the Supreme Court believes it is so. In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court
characterizes the production of wheat for personal use as economic activity. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at
560-61; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. Likewise, in NFIB, Justice Roberts cites both the production of
wheat and marijuana, for personal use, as an economic activity. See note 191. This may seem hard to
square with the majority's observation in Raich that the production of marijuana was not commerce, but
the Court was apparently using the word "commerce" to mean buying and selling goods. Raich, 545 U.S.
at 17. It used the word "economic" to mean "the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities." Id. at 25. Although the production of marijuana for personal use, like the production of
wheat for personal use, is not commerce, per se, the production of a fungible commodity that could
enter the stream of commerce, can be said to be economic activity.
201See Timothy Sandefur, So It's a Tax, Now What?; Some ofthe Problems Remaining After NFIB
v. Sebelius, TEX. REV. L. & POL. 203, 4 (2013).
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Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito share the Chief Justice's interpretation of the
commerce power. 202 For now, these limitations on Commerce Clause
enactments constitute the Supreme Court's majority view.
This same majority views the production of wheat and marijuana as
economic activities. 203 The Supreme Court has, therefore, yet to determine
how far the Commerce Clause may go in authorizing federal regulation of
noneconomic intrastate activity. According to Justice Scalia, Lopez suggests
"Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is
a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce."204
The Supreme Court did not, however, address such a fact pattern in
Wickard or Raich, and neither Lopez nor Morrison had anything to do with

economic activity.205 As such, this remains an open question.
Wickard still represents the farthest reach of the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause cases. 206 Raich is a quintessential Wickard case that did
not expand the power of Congress. 20 7 Wickard and Raich both involved a
consideration of the "substantial affects" test and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Although some argue that these cases authorize the regulation of
any activity that undermines a broad federal regulatory scheme, 208 Wickard
and Raich only addressed a broad economic scheme directed at an entire
market in fungible commodities in those cases, . The Supreme Court has
never relied on a Wickard/Raich analysis to resolve a case that did not
involve a market type statute. Although the Affordable Care Act was clearly
such a statute, the Act went too far. Thus, Wickard and Raich provided no
precedent for the Affordable Care Act.209

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2588.
2,4 Raich, 545 U.S. at 37.
205 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
206 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2588.
207 Id. at 2646 ("[Raich's] prohibition of growing (cf. Wickard, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82,
87
L.Ed. 122), and of possession (cf. innumerable federal statutes) did not represent the expansion of the
federal power to direct into a broad new field.").
201 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & George A. Kimbrell, Clear the Air: Gonzalez v. Raich, the
"Comprehensive Scheme" Principle, and the Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 35 ENVIL. L.
491, 494 (2005).
2 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2646 ("Raich is no precedent for what Congress has done here.").
202
203
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The Supreme Court will undoubtedly apply Wickard and Raich to cases
involving statutes addressed directly to interstate economic activity. The
Court will undoubtedly give Congress a great deal of leeway to regulate
intrastate activities that support those statutes. It is likely, however, that the
five justices that rejected the individual mandate in NFIB because it
exceeded the commerce power would limit Wickard and Raich to uphold
"congressional regulation of an interstate market."210
As for statutes or challenged provisions that are not directed at
interstate markets, like many of the nation's federal environmental laws, the
court should apply the "substantial effects" analysis refined in Lopez and
Morrison and consider: (1) whether the Act contains an "express
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of
[activities] that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on
interstate commerce;" (2) whether the statute or "its legislative history
contains express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate
commerce" of the regulated activity; and, (3), whether the connection
between the regulated activity and a substantial effect on interstate
commerce is remote.2 n
In all of its Commerce Clause cases, the present court can be expected
to rely on "first principles" and reject any interpretation of the commerce
power that leads to unlimited federal authority. As Justice Scalia noted with
some exasperation in NFIB, "[t]he Government was invited, at oral
argument, to suggest what federal controls over private conduct (other than
those explicitly prohibited by the Bill of Rights or other constitutional
controls) could not be justified as necessary and proper for the carrying out
of a general regulatory scheme. . . . It was unable to name any."212

Accordingly, Justice Roberts concluded:

210Raic, 545 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Unlike the power to regulate activities that have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate
commerce can only be exercised in conjunction rith congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it

extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective.") (emphasis added).
211 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12.
212

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647.
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The lesson of these cases is that the Commerce Clause,
even when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help
achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of
commerce. And [Lopez and Morrison] show that the scope
of the Necessary and Proper Clause is exceeded not only
when the congressional action directly violates the
sovereignty of the States but also when it violates the
background principle of enumerated (and hence limited)
federal power.213

213

Id. at 2646.
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